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n the book The Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us 
About Truth, Love, and the Meaning of Life, author Alison Gopnik 
recounts how fellow developmental psychologist John Flavell 
mused about giving up all his hard-earned academic degrees and 
achievements in exchange for just five minutes inside the head of 
a two-year-old. This in a sense is a vivid description of Gopnik’s 
goal in her ambitious book. Here she explores the mind of the 
child by integrating philosophical questioning about the mind 
with the empirical discoveries of developmental psychology 
(having academic backgrounds in both disciplines), all this while 
skirting around dry and stuffy academic language in favor of a 
more relaxed yet lucid prose that makes her writing accessible to 
a wider audience. And quite an achievement it was.   
The book made it to major bestseller lists as well as a couple 
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remarkable accomplishment for an academic, or indeed for any 
philosopher, alive today. One can perhaps say that it is one of the 
most successful books of philosophy published in the last decade 
(if measured solely in terms of audience reach and popularity for 
I cannot vouch for its success as a book in developmental 
psychology). The book can be seen as a kind of billboard 
advertising some of the most pivotal insights and discoveries 
made by academics on the study of the human mind in general 
and the child’s mind in particular. The book’s importance then 
lies in the fact that it aims to transmit to the wider public key and 
vital knowledge which warrants prima facie acceptance on the 
grounds that it is reported by a proper authority and expert on 
the subject. Given these considerations the book deserves a 
closer look and in this extended review I examine some of its 
major claims about the mind of the child and will see if it stands 
up to philosophical scrutiny. 
Gopnik does not shy away from making bold and contentious 
claims in her book. Some of these claims include the almost 
paradoxical role of uninhibited imagination and exploring make-
believe worlds (and having make-believe friends) in the child’s 
learning and acquiring knowledge about the actual world (and 
other actual people), the child’s natural capacity for empathy as 
well as his/her surprisingly speedy developing understanding of 
basic moral concepts (such as harm and fairness which disputes 
earlier views of children as selfish and egocentric), as well as the 
sense of self that allegedly emerges rather slowly and only later on 
in the young child’s development. In this review however I shall 
focus on two of what I think are her most intriguing conclusions 
about the child’s mind: (1) children learn about the world in  
 




much the same way as scientists do when they construct elaborate 
explanatory and predictive theories and (2) children are actually 
“more conscious” than adults. 
The Child as Scientist 
According to Gopnik, children are unconsciously some of the 
most rational creatures. Unlike us adults, much of the world 
around them is new or unexplored. It is only natural for them to 
be unremittingly curious and fascinated. So how do they go about 
exploring and learning about all these things? What is the 
underlying learning mechanism that facilitates the acquisition of 
vast amounts of knowledge about the world?  
Gopnik suggests that children develop causal theories of the 
world in almost the same manner that scientists do insofar as it 
helps in making predictions, explaining events, inferring what can 
be possible and impossible in given situations and circumstances, 
as well as revising theories in light of recalcitrant evidence. 1 
Gopnik has long explored the parallels and connections between 
scientific reasoning and developmental psychology2  and this is 
definitely an extension of this exploration. She claims that just as 
in the sciences children also construct psychological, biological, 
and physical theories. Crucially, she makes a caveat that these 
theories are “largely unconscious rather than conscious, and they 
are coded in children’s brains, instead of being written down on 
paper or presented at scientific conferences.” 3  These causal  
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theories are said to work like internal mental maps which aim to  
provide the child with an accurate cognitive representation of the 
world and how it works. Gopnik claims that cognitive maps in 
general are also constructed by other animals such as rats who 
can easily navigate a maze after exploring all its nooks and 
crannies. However, these maps made in rat minds are mostly just 
spatial maps. Rats are not capable of constructing causal maps, at 
least not in the elaborate, full-blown way that we humans do.4 
Mere stimulus-response learning is certainly very different from 
constructing theories which may also involve making 
sophisticated counterfactual inferences (basically judging possible 
outcomes arising from different scenarios and circumstances) and 
recognizing statistical patterns. 
Understanding other people is a more specialized kind of 
understanding that is allegedly unique to us humans. It is often 
pointed out that we humans have a fairly sophisticated capacity 
for social cognition; that we can have a robust and fine-grained 
understanding of the psychological perspectives of others. 
Gopnik suggests that a similar cognitive mechanism is at work 
here; that children construct a so-called “theory of mind,” a 
psychological causal map which allows them to make predictions, 
explanations, and counterfactual inferences about their own 
mental states as well as the mental states of others. According to 
Gopnik: 
One of the central tenets of this theory of mind is 
that people may have different beliefs, perceptions, 
emotions, and desires and that those differences may 
 
4 Ibid., 41–42. 




lead to different actions. People behave differently 
because they have different kinds of minds.5 
This sort of theoretical understanding of the causal interaction 
between various mental states is often portrayed as “mindreading.” 
Acquiring knowledge of this kind equips children with the skills 
necessary to navigate the complex social environment of human 
beings. Some of these skills include detecting how others can 
possess false beliefs, coming up with claims that aim to deceive 
other people, as well as being able to exert “executive control” 
over their own thoughts, actions, and emotions.6 
In A. C. Grayling’s7 review of Gopnik’s book he recognizes a 
familiar worry of “reading-in” and making interpretations and 
attributions that may have gone a little too far in attempts at 
understanding what is going on inside the child’s mind.8 On this 
regard I concur that Gopnik was perhaps a bit indulgent. One 
can’t help but wonder if Gopnik as a scientist is interpreting a 
general capacity to encounter the world in the ways in which she 
is most familiar with, namely from the viewpoint of a scientist. 
This is not necessarily wrong but at the same time this kind of 
intellectualizing impulse may blind us to other interesting and 
productive ways of understanding the child. A theoretical and 
thoroughly reflective and objective scientific attitude of 
encountering the world is only one way of encountering the  
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world. Another way is of course the more practical, more 
engaged mode of encountering the world. In Heideggerian 
parlance we encounter the world not just as present-at-hand but 
also more fundamentally as ready-to-hand.  
In comparing children and scientists Gopnik is also careful to 
point out crucial dissimilarities. However, sometimes the dis-
analogies are simply too hard to ignore and perhaps substantive 
enough to render the comparison questionable. For instance, as 
mentioned earlier, Gopnik claims that this type of learning in the 
child is largely unconscious; rather than appearing in the 
reflective consciousness of the child. This theoretical 
representational reconstruction of the world occurs “offline” as it 
were, deep in the subconscious mind of the child. But aren’t 
scientific theories the way they are because of a very careful, 
reflective, and deliberate process of conscious thought? We do 
form causal-explanatory judgments about the world as a matter 
of course in our everyday lives and that these often are quick and 
automatic rather than careful and reflective judgments. But this 
precisely marks a big difference. Much of our quick and 
automatic judgments of this kind are simply the result of our 
everyday abductive explanatory practices, say when we step out 
of an enclosed building and find the street wet and subsequently 
conclude that it must have just rained. This may be sound 
judgment but to say that these judgments qualify as scientific 
seems to stretch it a bit too far in part because it lacks the 
theoretical systematicity and even the methodological reflexivity 
that scientific judgments often aim for.  
Gopnik relates a finding in which children often explain 
biological events and processes in terms of some kind of vitalist 
life force. This seems like a fairly sophisticated and systematic 




explanation but it also seems to flout other critical criteria (such 
as precision, parsimony, falsifiability) for judging whether a claim 
is truly scientific. These reflections on how we make scientific 
judgments show how careful, reflective, and deliberate conscious 
judgment is in a way central (though perhaps unacknowledged) in 
making scientific theories the way they are. If this is true then 
comparing the supposedly unconscious learning process in the 
child with the thoroughly reflective (let alone social) practice of 
scientific theorizing may seem like an overreach and over-
attribution.  
Perhaps this unconscious learning process simply mirrors our 
everyday abductive explanatory practices rather than our scientific 
practices. That said, further questions abound with this picture of 
learning Gopnik presents us. It may be possible that we are 
unconsciously constructing cognitive “maps” of our surroundings 
just as rats do in navigating a maze. However, one can do away 
with a heavily representationalist view and instead explain how 
we get around in terms of perceptual affordances. The 
“mapping” metaphor is also one that is criticized for neglecting 
the social-cultural dimensions of learning. 9  Moreover, Gopnik 
clearly stakes her claim on a “theory theory” approach to social 
cognition that makes largely unconscious theories about other 
people’s beliefs, desires, and other mental states. But this is not 
the only known approach. There is also simulation theory10 and, 
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the one that I am partial to, interaction theory. 11  Interaction 
theory for example explicitly rejects the mentalizing, 
intellectualizing, and individualist tendencies of the other two 
approaches. These tendencies are few of the remaining remnants 
of the Cartesian picture of cognition. Taking its cue from insights 
in the phenomenological tradition, interaction theory favors a 
primary intersubjective and embodied perceptual attunement in 
our engagement with others.  
One of the strong attractions of interaction theory in my view, 
is how it naturally and easily accommodates our common 
experience and practice of relating and communicating with 
others. It does not rely on a third-personal observational stance 
in theorizing about social cognition. Instead it emphasizes a more 
second-personal intersubjective stance which is more engaged, 
relational, and participatory in nature. The view of social 
cognition Gopnik presents in her book still relies heavily on the 
Cartesian picture with its overly intellectualist and individualist 
notion of understanding and encountering the world. But infants 
do not necessarily start out as isolated subjects whose cognitive 
access to the world is by way of making unconscious accurate 
maps or representations of it. Infants already have a primary 
access to the world through others, mostly their mothers. Infants 
are already immersed in a world of intersubjectivity from the very 
start. This sensitivity to the primordial intersubjective life of the 
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the “theory theory” approach, mentioned above, problematic and 
implausible. It is not that Gopnik does not recognize the 
importance and value of parent-child relationships, she of course 
does. It is more that her commitments may prevent her from 
seeing the deeper ontological and epistemological implications of 
this kind of relationship.  
What It Is Like to Be a Child 
One of the most fascinating chapters in Gopnik’s book is her 
chapter on infant consciousness. The chapter is a speculative 
exploration of what it is like to be an infant and young child. But 
ever the dutiful scientist, Gopnik tries to ground her claims on 
empirical evidence. She does this by pointing us to empirical 
work on attention. Attention according to her is often portrayed 
by psychologists as something like a spotlight.12 Paying attention 
works by directing our conscious awareness at particular features 
of the environment within our perceptual reach. But there are of 
course different ways by which our conscious awareness is 
directed. Gopnik remarks on the distinction between endogenous 
and exogenous attention.13 Attention that is goal-oriented, narrowly 
focused, and voluntarily controlled is called endogenous attention 
while attention that is less focused and is usually directed by 
outside stimuli is called exogenous attention. Gopnik notes that 
“[f]or babies, attention is much more likely to be captured by 
interesting external events than directed by internal plans and 
goals . . . Endogenous attention seems to develop quite slowly all 
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the way through the preschool years.”14 This fact, that children 
get easily distracted all the time, should be quite obvious to 
anyone who has ever been around a child. 
So how then do children learn more about the world when 
their attention is mostly scattered and aimless? Gopnik thinks 
that this is a matter of an “evolutionary division of labor” 
between children and adults.15 For adults what is important is 
pursuing certain ends and purposes in which a more focused, 
goal-oriented attention directed at useful and relevant aspects of 
the environment is certainly conducive. For the child however 
the evolutionary imperative is to “learn as much as they can as 
quickly as possible.”16 What’s more important for children is for 
them to construct an accurate causal map of their surroundings 
which provides the impetus and motivation for a more wide-
spanning conscious awareness of the world around them. In 
neurological terms exogenous attention helps in making more 
and more neural connections in the brain while endogenous 
attention is concerned with pruning the less significant 
connections and retaining the ones more relevant to one’s plans 
and goals.17 Indeed, this wide-viewed, panoptic form of attention 
is perhaps most conducive to a more exploratory form of 
conscious experience that is ostensibly available to the child. So 
while children’s attention is more uninhibited, this lack of 
inhibition allows them to take in more information about their 
surrounding environment thus facilitating more learning. 
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Given the vast difference in attentional capacities between 
children and adults, what is it like then to have this kind of 
childlike conscious awareness? Gopnik offers us a rather 
“illuminating” analogical picture: 
It's plausible that babies are actually aware of much 
more, much more intensely, than we are. The 
attentional spotlight in adults seems more like an 
attentional lantern for babies. Instead of experiencing 
a single aspect of their world and shutting down 
everything else, they seem to be vividly experiencing 
everything at once . . . While they inhibit distractions 
less well, more of the field of consciousness will be 
available to them. This also suggests that they are 
more conscious than we are.18 
Gopnik thinks that children’s attention is far richer since it can 
take in more features available in their immediate perceptual 
environment. She helpfully compares this childlike conscious 
experience with our more familiar experience of travelling and 
exploring an exotic country. Everything is new to us so our 
experience of the place is supposedly more intense and vivid. 
Gopnik seems to be implying in this analogy a close connection 
between novel experiences and wider attention; that exogenous 
forms of attention can assist in detecting and taking in more new 
information about a world that is foreign and unfamiliar to us. 
However, one can think that a child can easily familiarize herself 
with the contours of her own room for instance but that does not  
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automatically make her attention more endogenous. The child 
can arguably be just as distractible in her own room as she is 
easily distractible in a foreign country. So this wide-spanning, 
panoptic attention exhibited by the child (if divorced from having 
novel experiences) does not entail having an intense and vivid 
experience. It is one thing to say that an experience is intense and 
vivid because it is novel (like in the travel analogy) and another 
thing to say that it is intense and vivid because we are aware of 
much more of it. I am not so sure about the latter. Novel 
experiences can for sure be rich and exciting but simply having a 
wide-spanning attention does not necessarily evoke these same 
feelings. Speculating that the child’s experience is more intense 
and vivid (and therefore more conscious) just because it is aware 
of much more falls a little flat. A narrow and focused conscious 
awareness can be just as intense and vivid if not more so. 
Curiously absent in Gopnik’s discussion of child attention is the 
phenomenon of joint attention. This I think is a massive oversight 
since first, it can be argued that a large swathe of knowledge the 
child acquires about the world she obtains through joint attention 
(and not merely by attending to things on her own); and second, 
joint attention offers a more plausible picture of learning that 
seems more in line with our highly interactive and social nature. 
Joint attention precisely provides the opportunity for the child to 
learn about the world with the helpful attentional nudge of an adult 
caregiver. In fact it has been demonstrated that just one instance of 
active ostensive-communicative signaling from an adult (in 
contrast with a mere passive observation on the part of the child) 




facilitates learning of general concepts.19 Gopnik’s discussion of 
attention thus again suffers the same weaknesses as her accounts 
of social cognition and learning in general. It is too individualistic 
an account of attention and fails to consider the interactive and 
socially significant ways in which attention is deployed by the 
young child.  To be fair, I should point out that Gopnik also 
recognizes the important ways in which we learn from others but 
this is once again explained from a third-personal, observational 
standpoint and hence still lies well within the Cartesian picture. It 
is one thing to pay due attention to our intensely social nature as 
a species but it is quite another thing to seriously consider the 
deeper implications of this intense sociality in our ways of 
encountering and experiencing the world. 
This leads us back to my earlier discussion of interaction theory 
and intersubjectivity in the infant. The capacity of the child to 
engage in joint attention is a further development of the primary 
intersubjective access that is clearly evident very early in the child’s 
life. The child psychologist Colwyn Trevarthen makes a helpful 
distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity. 
Primary intersubjectivity concerns strictly dyadic face-to-face 
interactions between a prelinguistic child and her caregiver while 
secondary intersubjectivity widens that interaction to involve 
reference to objects and events in the environment. 20  Joint 
attention is an instance of secondary intersubjectivity which occurs  
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later than primary intersubjectivity. From a primary interactive and 
relational awareness with one’s caregiver, this socially coordinated 
form of attention expands to the wider world around the child 
and heavily informs her learning of that world. 21  The 
interpersonal and interactive manner in which attention develops 
in the child may even lead us toward novel accounts of human 
conscious experiences that seriously take its rich intersubjective 
dimension, often overlooked in standard accounts. 
Despite my serious objections to some of Gopnik’s claims 
about the mind of the child, this book in my opinion, is still 
worth a look. It offers a highly informative and highly accessible 
overview of some important empirical work in developmental 
psychology, neuroscience, and related disciplines straight from an 
authoritative voice. At the same time it gives us a glimpse of how 
this kind of empirical sensitivity can lead to novel insights in a 
host of philosophical issues (noteworthy here is her chapter on 
the origins of morality).  
The intellectualizing impulse and the Cartesian assumptions 
that go with it lead to some questionable interpretations and 
attributions and should be greeted with a healthy degree of 
skepticism. A thoroughly representational and mentalistic account 
of how we encounter and experience the world misses out on the 
socially diverse and manifold ways in which this encounter and 
experience is instantiated. Interaction theory, I suggest, is better 
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